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INTRODUCTION
This Research Topic aimed at deepening our understanding of
the levels and explanations that are of interest for cognitive sci-
entists, neuroscientists, psychologists, behavioral scientists, and
philosophers of science.
Indeed, contemporary developments in neuroscience and psy-
chology suggest that scientists are likely to deal with a multiplicity
of levels, where each of the different levels entails laws of behavior
appropriate to that level (Berntson et al., 2012). Also, gathering
and modeling data at the different levels of analysis is not suffi-
cient: the integration of information across levels of analysis is a
crucial issue.
Given such state of affairs, a number of interesting questions
arise. How can the autonomy of explanatory levels be properly
understood in behavioral explanation? Is reductionism a satis-
factory strategy? How can high-level and low-level models be
constrained in order to be actually explanatory of both behav-
ioral and neurological or molecular evidence? What is the kind of
relationship between those models?
PLURALITY OF LEVELS WITH AND BEYOND MARR
Marr (1982) distinguished between three levels of explanation,
the what/why level (computational theory), the how level (algo-
rithm), and the physical realization level (implementation). His
influential framework has had a far-reaching influence in both
neuroscience and cognitive science over the years and it has
become a sort of paradigm. However, the tremendous develop-
ments in such sciences suggest that there will hardly be only three
levels of explanation.
For instance, Castelfranchi (2014) claims for several different
layers of “theory”: the cognitive representations and mechanisms;
the neural processes; the evolutionary history and adaptive func-
tions of our cognition and behaviors; the social structures and
dynamics with their relation and feedbacks on individual minds
and behaviors; the historical and cultural mechanisms; the devel-
opmental paths.
Clearly, on the one hand, dealing with such complexities calls
for models that simulate those processes so that they can be used
as explanatory tools, i.e., instances of the “synthetic” method
(Cordeschi, 2002). In this perspective, Conte and Paolucci (2014)
make the point that simple recipes have prevailed up to now and
shadowed the application of rich cognitive models. As a viable
solution, they discuss Agent Based Modeling and its role at the
highest behavioral level of Computational Social Science.
On the other hand, to cope with multi-level complexity, Abney
et al. (2014) propose explanatory pluralism. They present one
concrete example, the analysis of a corpus of conversing indi-
viduals solving a joint decision-making task, performed by using
decision-making at the behavioral level, confidence sharing at the
linguistic level, acoustic energy at the physical level.
A further interesting issue is that of the objective vs. subjec-
tive meaning of the explanatory levels. Varma (2014) discusses
how Marr’s approach focused on the objective meaning of each
level—how it supports computational models that correspond to
cognitive phenomena—and he develops a complementary analy-
sis of the subjective meaning of each level—how it helps cognitive
scientists understand cognition. With the goal of showing that
different kinds of explanation arise because we have different
kinds of explanatory concerns, a clear case study is proposed
by Wilkinson (2014) by using contrasting theories of delusional
misidentification.
RELATIONSHIPS, CONSTRAINTS AND MECHANISMS
Addressing any level of description involves a certain degree of
realist commitment at that level, which, in turn, has some con-
sequences on the problems of reduction and of causality between
levels. In this respect, one important case study is presented by
Albertazzi and Poli (2014), who address the conundrum of color.
They claim that color is a different entity for each level of reality
and it generates different observables in the epistemologies of the
different sciences.
Ramos (2014) introduces the hypothesis that the sophisticated
psychological constructs classically associated with the concept of
mental representation are essentially of the same nature of simple
interactive behaviors. Thus, the capacity of generating elaborated
mental phenomena like beliefs and desires emerges gradually
during evolution, and social interaction. Here, mental represen-
tations are biological phenomena whose construction is achieved
by a correlational mechanism of information exchange with the
external world.
In a related perspective and in order to cope with the mul-
tiscale nature (Abney et al., 2014) of cognitive and behavioral
phenomena, Costa and Ferraro (2014) argue that a statistical
mechanics approach is almost inescapable. Starting from very
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simple systems, connectivity gives rise to levels of increasing
functional complexity.
Here the key issue is that, at any level, systems obey laws hold-
ing for the lower levels; meanwhile, they are subjected to new
constraints (related to and implemented through neural struc-
tures). These, in turn, generate new features, like novel patterns
of activity, requiring adequate levels of representation in terms of
model structures and variables.
Indeed, accounting for constraints is a central point: as Abney
et al. (2014) put it, “mapping across levels should create mutual
constraints, in that levels should be consistent, if qualitatively,
with each other.” A hallmark of the present state of research in
cognitive/behavioral sciences is that one is generally ignorant of
how exactly to cast the different levels into a grounded relation-
ship. In this case the notions of structure and architecture—and
related graphical modeling tools—become crucial, since they are
necessary to embody constraints at the chosen level of explanation
(Boccignone and Cordeschi, 2007, 2012).
The exploitation of structure/architecture as a tool for bridg-
ing intra- and inter-level constraints has the merit of paving
the way for reconciling rational or information-based analyzes
(Danks, 2008) with mechanism-based explanations (Bechtel and
Abrahamsen, 2005). As fostered by Castelfranchi (2014), “laws”
are not enough, both the “why” and “how” must be addressed.
In this respect, Datteri and Laudisa (2014) lucidly address
the subtelties of graphical explanations, making the case for
the relationship between box-and-arrow (BA) explanations and
neuroscientific mechanism descriptions (NMDs). The interest-
ing point raised by Datteri and Laudisa is that the BA analysis
imposes constraints on the formulation of the NMD by postu-
lating a number of regularities to be sought for in the neural
activities of the system. Conversely, the NMD constrains the space
of the possible BA analyzes of the system by postulating a number
of neural regularities.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, the papers in “What levels of explanation in the
behavioral sciences” give us some important indications of where
the field is going and also demonstrate how lively and open the
field is today.
We hope this Research Topic paves the way to new avenues and
challenges for future work.
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